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Wesley Salmon and Michael Martin argue that scientific considerations about the
order in the universe justify atheism. After sketching Salmon’s argument, I examine
the nature of begging the question and argue that Martin takes a sufficient condition
of that fallacy to be a necessary condition. After a pragmatic account to the fallacy
is recommended, I point out how Salmon’s and Martin’s beg the question against all
save those who already adhere to atheism and that the crucial considerations that
they take to be distinctly scientific are really extra-scientific considerations, giving
a specious impression that they are uncontroversial to all who accept mainstream
science.
1. Introduction
That the universe exhibits order is lost on very few who take the slightest effort
to think about the world. Much of contemporary scientific teaching consists in
conveying to students the regular, consistent patterns of behavior of both inor-
ganic and organic constituents of the world. That there is order in the world is
uncontroversial. What remains controversial is what we should make of the
observable order. The Argument from Design is famous for deriving theistic
conclusions from the order of the universe. Contemporary versions of this argu-
ment like the Fine Tuning Argument appeal to quite specific fortuitous convergen-
ces of states of the world for some apparent purpose, like the genesis, develop-
ment, and thriving of the human race.
Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion famously contain the ca-
nonical criticisms of theistic arguments from design. Anyone hoping to infer the
existence of the theistic God from the regular patterns in the world must contend
not only with Hume’s attempts to undermine this inference, but they must also
contend with Hume’s twist on the problem of evil. Not only does the existence
and character of observable apparent evil consist in a kind of disorder that un-
dermines the theistic inference, but they also, says Hume’s Philo, provide grist
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for the mill of someone inferring that the world most definitely is not created by
the theistic God. Lesser gods, at best, seem to be the best explanation for the
apparent inconveniences and the horrific evils of which we are all too often all
too aware.
Wesley Salmon picks up this thread in Hume’s Dialogues and develops an
atheistic teleological argument.1 In brief, Salmon’s argument is that since nearly
all of the ordered things in the universe do not have disembodied, perfect, infi-
nite, solitary creators, if there is any probable conclusion to be derived about the
universe as a whole, it is that it was not created by God. Nancy Cartwright
maintains that Salmon’s argument begs the question2 and Michael Martin has
weighed in to defend Salmon’s argument from this charge and to restate and to
expand the argument.3 In this paper I will argue that the Salmon/Martin argu-
ments do, indeed, beg the question and because of this they serve no useful
apologetic function for the atheist.
2. The Dispute
Salmon’s argument is Bayesian. Using Cartwright’s and Martin’s heuristics, let
D = the class of objects created by an intelligent being
O = the class of objects that exhibit order
P(D,O) = the probability that an object created by an intelligent being
exhibits order
P(∼D,O) = the probability that an object not created by an intelligent being
exhibits order
P(D) = the probability of an object created by an intelligent being
P(O) = the probability of an object exhibiting order
P(∼D) = the probability of an object not created by an intelligent being
P(O,D) = the probability that an object exhibiting order is created by an
intelligent being
P(O,∼D) = the probability that an object exhibiting order is not created by an
intelligent being.
Bayes’ Theorem, then, becomes:
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Accordingly,
P(O,D) = [P(D,O) × P(D)] / P(O)
P(O,∼D) = [P(∼D,O) × P(∼D)] / P(O)
As with all Bayesian analyses, the prior probabilities are the problematic
items in the analysis, save for well-defined situations like draws from a standard
deck of playing cards or rolls of fair dice. Salmon attempts to discharge the
obligation of providing a fair assessment of these probabilities, P(D) and P(~D),
as follows. To be sure there are a great many designed objects: watches, sky-
scrapers, and computers, but there are so many more things that are not the
result of the activities of intelligent beings—atoms and molecules, planets and
galaxies—that P(~D) is much greater than P(D).4 P(D,O) is high, but it is not 1
because intelligent beings sometimes produce disorder, even intentionally. Sci-
ence tells us that P(~D,O) is not insignificant; laws of nature tell us that order
can result in the absence of intelligent intervention. So, says Salmon, “we are in
a position to say, quite confidently,” that P(O,D) is very low.
Cartwright objects that Salmon begs the question, specifically in his assess-
ment of P(∼D,O) and P(∼D). As Salmon himself points out, one problem is that
items that might plausibly be assigned to the classes D and ∼D are quite differ-
ent from the item with which we are primarily concerned: the universe as whole.5
Just as important, though, is the fact that the assignments of an object to D or ∼D
is not given in any sufficiently objective and theory-neutral manner. Proponents
and critics of the theistic and atheistic arguments make the assignments to these
categories, producing the risk that our samples are biased, not by common causes
that confuse us regarding causation and mere correlation but by the theoretician’s
bias of seeing what is helpful for the theory and ignoring what is not. Salmon is
not entitled, in the context of developing an atheistic argument from design, to
assign to ∼D the multitude of items that fail to have human creators,
for it is the atoms whose origins are at issue. Even if we are willing to take red shifts and
cosmic background radiation as sufficient evidence for a “big bang” theory, we may still
ask whether the original material from which the laws of mechanics shape the universe
was, in all probability, randomly distributed or whether it is more likely that God put it
just so, with an eye to getting out, eons later, just this universe with just this intricate
arrangement of parts. The fact is, it is very difficult to assess the probabilities induc-
tively, for there are so few cases on whose origins the theist and the anti-theist can agree.6
Martin’s quick defence of Salmon against the charge of begging the question is
that
to beg the question is to assume what one is supposed to prove. Salmon was out to show
that it is probable that the universe was not designed by an intelligent being, and he
assumed in his premises that atoms, molecules, and galaxies were not the result of intel-
ligent design. This is not what he was out to prove unless one supposes that the universe
is nothing more than atoms, molecules, and galaxies. But it is not clear that Salmon
assumes this.71 Wesley C. Salmon, “Religion and Science: A New Look at Hume’s Dialogues,” Philosophi-
cal Studies, 33 (1978), 143–76.
2 Nancy Cartwright, “Comments on Wesley Salmon’s ‘Science and Religion …’,” Philosophical
Studies, 33 (1978), 177–83.
3 Michael Martin, “Atheistic Teleological Arguments,” in R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan
Sweetman, Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1992), 43–77; reprinted from Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1990), Ch. 3.
4 Being a frequentist about probability, it is natural that Salmon assesses these probabilities in
a straightforward fashion by counting instances. Cf. Salmon, “Religion and Science,” 150–2.
There is no need to contest this philosophy of probability here.
5 Cartwright, “Comments,” 183 H; Salmon, “Religion and Sciences,” pp. 152–8.
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So Salmon’s argument is supposed not to be defective because he doesn’t
use his conclusion as a premise; he argues for it. Given that Cartwright implic-
itly agrees with Martin on this point, as evidenced by the fact that she never
accuses Salmon of asserting that the universe is not designed in his attempt to
prove that it is not, she must have had something besides this kind of assump-
tion in mind when she levelled the charge of begging the question. To the nature
of that fallacy I now briefly turn.
3. Begging the Question
In recent memory it has been disputed whether there even is a fallacy of begging
the question.8 I will assume that there is some fallacy that is roughly characterised
by the assumption of what is to be proven. Before we can make any fine-grained
determination of whether Salmon’s and Martin’s arguments beg the question,
we must have before us a somewhat more precise account of the fallacy. Ap-
proaches to begging the question take two general forms: syntactic/formal and
epistemic/pragmatic. In a currently-popular textbook, Trudy Govier provides a
formal account of the fallacy. She says: “Begging the question is a fallacy that
occurs when the premise or premises … state the conclusion (usually in slightly
different words) ….”9 A similar syntactic proposal is made by Kent Wilson.10
Taken as a necessary and sufficient condition, such a formal account permits us
to determine whether the fallacy is committed by simply examining the form of
the argument independent of the argumentative context in which it is used. If an
argument is put in a standard form, we can determine whether it begs the ques-
tion by noting whether the conclusion appears as a premise in that argument. If
it does, the argument commits the fallacy; if not, not.
Strictly speaking, Govier’s condition is only a sufficient condition for the
occurrence of the fallacy. Evidently, however, Martin takes something like this
portion of Govier’s characterisation of the fallacy to be at least a necessary
condition for the occurrence of the fallacy since he claims that Salmon’s argu-
ment does not beg the question because it, indeed, fails to have its conclusion as
a premise. Circularity is not, I think, a necessary condition for begging the ques-
tion precisely because it leaves no space for other, more subtle, ways of begging
the question. That begging the question is a more subtle fallacy is evidenced by
the fact that the charge of begging the question is not typically established or
refuted by a simple, mechanical examination of a philosophical argument.
Whether an argument begs the question at hand is sometimes hard to discern
and at times the relevant parties are unable, after considerable effort, to reach
consensus about whether the fallacy is committed. Were this formal condition a
necessary condition, there would be little room for outstanding issues of ques-
tion begging, save, perhaps, for some unresolved issues about the proper logical
form of an assertion made in ordinary language. With all translational issues
resolved, that the fallacy is not committed would be easily decided, though if
there were other necessary conditions it would be more difficult to establish that
the fallacy is committed in a particular instance. It is unlikely, though, that all
outstanding issues about whether an argument begs the question involve unclar-
ity about exactly which propositions are asserted by the premises and conclu-
sions involved. The history of philosophy is unlikely to exonerate this analysis
as faithful to the ways in which the charge has been levelled and resisted. So,
this partial analysis is deficient even though it makes sense of Martin’s handling
of Cartwright’s charge.11
A reason to think that this crude collapse of question begging into circularity
is not even a sufficient condition is that it rules out as fallacious all valid argu-
ments in which the premise is logically equivalent to the conclusion. There are
examples of substantial theses that are provably equivalent, the equivalence of
which required proof. Consider the Axiom of Choice and Zorn’s Lemma.
Zermelo-Frænkel set theory proves that they are equivalent. To prove one and
then to prove the other on its basis would be a substantial intellectual endeavor
and hardly involve begging the question.
Perhaps, it might be held, that the key issue is not in the use of the conclu-
sion as (part of) a premise, but in the “containment” of the conclusion in the
premises, taken as a group. To be an advance on the formal approach broached
above, the containment relation must be something less formal to accommodate
the sometime subtlety of the fallacy. Govier continues her characterisation of
begging the question by saying that the fallacy occurs when the premises “logi-
cally presuppose that the conclusion is true.”12 Robert Fogelin  and Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong suggest something similar: “In begging the question, a premise is
used that presupposes or depends upon the point at issue.”13 Though neither
defines logical presupposition or dependence, we might take a clue from counter-
factual dependence and say that the premises presuppose the conclusion just in
case were the conclusion not true, the premises would not be either.14 Alterna-
8 Richard Robinson, “Begging the Question,” Analysis, 31: (19712), 113–17: For a reply, see
Roy A. Sorensen, “Unbeggable Questions,” Analysis, 56: (1996) 51–55.
9 Trudy Govier, A Practical Study of Argument, 3rd edition (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1992), 85.
It is important that the condition requires that the conclusion be stated, rather than merely appear
in the premises, so that disjunctive syllogisms, simplifications, modus ponens and a host of other
valid arguments are not rejected as question-begging and fallacious.
10 Kent Wilson, “Circular Arguments,” Metaphilosophy, 19 (1988), 38–51.
11 For a defence of the claim that this syntactic criterion is not even a sufficient condition on
fallacious circularity, cf. Roy A. Sorensen, “‘P, Therefore, P’ Without Circularity,” Journal of
Philosophy, 88 (1991), 245–66.
12 Govier, A Practical Study of Argument, 85.
13 Robert J. Fogelin & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Understanding Arguments: An Introduction
to Informal Logic, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), 122
14 It is understandable if the subjunctive mood seems out of place when thinking about logical
dependence. The indicative mood, however, is clearly inadequate, yielding in this case the condi-
tional that if the conclusion is not true, then the premises are not all true, which is equivalent in
classical systems to the disjunction that either the conclusion is true or one or more premises are
false. This expresses neither dependence nor begging the question. The disjunction is satisfied by
many arguments in which the conclusion is logically independent of the premises and were it to
capture the fallacy of begging the question then all arguments for false conclusions as well as all
arguments with factual errors in the premises beg the question.
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tively, we might think that logical presupposition is a matter of logical relations,
so that the premises presuppose the conclusion just in case the falsity of the
conclusion entails the falsity of at least one premise. Or, perhaps, the idea of
logical presupposition is to be understood in terms of the truth conditions for
the premises and the conclusion. The premises presuppose the conclusion just
in case their truth conditions contain the conditions of truth for the conclusion.
Both the relation of logical presupposition/dependence and the containment
of truth conditions between premises and conclusion hold between any set of
premises and each of the logical consequences of that set, rendering all valid
arguments question begging according to this somewhat less formal account of
begging the question, which is surely much too strong, so long as begging the
question is a defect in an argument. It must be acknowledged that there have
been those who held that all valid arguments beg the question precisely because
in one of these senses, the premises contained the conclusion. According to this
line of thought, such premises could never lead us to new knowledge because to
understand the premises is to know their truth conditions and to know the truth
conditions is to know that the truth conditions of the conclusion is contained in
the truth conditions of the premises and, so, the conclusion is already asserted in
the premises by anyone understanding the premises. The error is to confuse
knowlege of a proposition with knowledge of all of its logical consequences or
to confuse knowledge of that proposition’s truth conditions with knowledge of
all of the constituent conditions of those truth conditions. To know what condi-
tions are conditions of truth for a given proposition is no more to know all of
their constituent conditions than knowledge that a table is made of wood is to
know the chemical composition of wood. Otherwise, only the chemically com-
petent would really know that a table is made of wood. Furthermore, to make all
valid arguments fallacious is to make all arguments fallacious. Valid arguments
are fallacious by virtue of their validity since the impossibility of true premises
and false conclusion is secured by the dependence or containment decried. In-
valid arguments are fallacious because they permit a false conclusion even if the
premises are true. Only quite thorough-going sceptics can afford such standards.
An exhaustive discussion of other formal or logical approaches is unlikely to
turn up a satisfactory account of begging the question because the analysis will
either be formal and make the fallacy appear to be more easily discerned than it
is, or else it will accommodate its sometimes elusive nature, but at the cost of
making all valid arguments fallacious. I suggest that an informal, even prag-
matic, approach to the fallacy is to be sought.
Sometimes the fallacy is said to be committed not by an argument in vacuo,
but by someone propounding an argument. A person is said to commit the fal-
lacy “when one assumes in the premise of an argument the very thing he or she
is trying to prove.”15 If assuming what one is trying to prove in a premise is just
stating it in a premise, then this is just the first characterisation examined above.
This account, though, at least begins to locate the issue in terms of what one
does or does not do in an effort to prove something rather than what an argu-
ment does or does not do. It is not so much that an argument begs the question as
it is that someone or other begs the question when using an argument. To revise
this proposal slightly, one might take begging the question to be a fallacy com-
mitted whenever one assumes one’s conclusion when providing an argument for
that conclusion. Though this gets us somewhat closer to the nature of the fallacy
and further away from the formal circularity account, it is still wide of the mark,
for at least two reasons. First, taken strictly, this account classifies many at-
tempts at confirmation as question begging. One might assume a proposition,
infer its observable consequences, note that the consequences were observed
and then conclude that the assumed proposition is true, probable, or more highly
confirmed than it once was. Surely not all attempts at confirmation or corrobo-
ration beg the question. Second, while at times one may be guilty of some intel-
lectual defect if one starts with a position and goes in search of a justification for
it, it is folly to think that there is anything like the Russellian virtue of “follow-
ing an argument where it leads”, having no idea where things will end up.16 This
is just not how to conduct a good intellectual life. When examining the conse-
quences of a set of premises and deciding whether someone else’s modus ponens
should be our own modus tollens, we must have some idea about when the
consequences of a set of premises take us beyond the pale, when they transgress
what we are reasonably sure we know. We begin any project of inquiry with
some apparent knowledge and we use inference sometimes to extend and some-
times to defend that knowledge. When trying to defend a position of which we
are reasonably sure, we quite properly begin the argumentative process by as-
suming our conclusion and search for premises to support it or premises to un-
dermine contrary considerations. This informal characterisation correctly lo-
cates the fallacy in the particulars of an arguer using a specific argument in a
specific context, but it locates it in the history of the argumentative endeavour
of the arguer alone. The scope of concern must be wider.
We get closer yet to the nature of the fallacy if we keep firmly in mind that an
argument typically takes place in a context and that an argument has the task of
convincing someone of the conclusion. An arguer will fail to persuade someone
of the truth of the conclusion if the argument appeals to something not accepted
by those one is trying to convince. One is always hostage to the opinions of
those one is trying to convince in that any appeal to what is not already believed
by one’s interlocutors requires that one provide them good reasons to believe
that proposition. Though it is inconveniently likely sometimes to appeal to what
our interlocutors do not already have good reason to believe, given the limited
range of the justified beliefs of each person, it hardly constitutes begging the
question. Persuasion demands common ground between arguer and audience
and when some necessary common ground is lacking it must be secured. Think-
15 Gerald Runkle, Good Thinking: An Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston), 55.
16 For a discussion of this point, see Mark T. Nelson, “On the Lack of ‘True Philosophic Spirit’
in Aquinas: Commitment v. Tracking in Philosophic Method,” Philosophy, 76 (2001), 283–96.
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ing of begging the question as an appeal to what is not accepted by one’s audi-
ence has the virtue of treating begging the question as context-dependent and
not as something that an argument typically possesses on its own. Someone
rather than some argument begs the question in some specific context when
certain particulars are at issue. The problem with the current proposal is simply
that it appeals too generally to the failure of both parties in a discussion to
accept a premise used by someone in their argument. I may fail in my argumen-
tative objective if I rely upon a premise not accepted by my audience. I do not,
thereby, commit a fallacy. The failure may be rectified by making that premise
acceptable to my audience, perhaps, by using a subsidiary argument in which
the offending premise is a conclusion for which good reasons have been given,
those reasons accepted and accepted as good reasons by my audience.
I submit that the fallacy of begging the question is committed by someone
when they appeal to at least one premise that is not rationally accepted by the
target audience by virtue of not yet accepting the conclusion of the proposed
argument. This view is the considered view of Govier and Douglas Walton. As
Govier puts it: “The conclusion cannot get any real support from the premise or
premises because it needs to be accepted in order for those premises to be ac-
cepted.”17 Walton also proposes something like this.
In a persuasion dialogue, the goal of each participant is to prove his conclusion from
premises that are accepted as commitments by the other participant. However, if a premise
has not already been explicitly accepted by a respondent, it must at least be a proposition
that he could possibly accept, consistent with his own obligation to prove his conclusion.
Otherwise, the argument using this premise as a basis could not be useful for the purpose
of persuading the respondent to accept its conclusion. This type of inadequate or useless
attempt at proof is a violation, error, or shortcoming in a persuasion dialogue, because
such an argument stands no chance of fulfilling its proponent’s obligation to prove his
conclusion in the discussion.18
It is this pragmatic account of begging the question with which I will work.
The account has the advantage of accommodating the fact that discerning the
fallacy is not simply a matter of inspecting a standard form of an argument or of
satisfactory paraphrases of premises and conclusion. It also does not entail that
all valid arguments beg the question. This account will enable us to see quite
clearly how Salmon’s and Martin’s atheistic teleological arguments beg the ques-
tion.
4. The Details Considered
To appreciate the full force of Philo’s discussion of Cleanthes’ argument from
design, it is useful to keep in mind that Cleanthes, as well as some contemporary
proponents of similar arguments, invokes facts of orderliness to make probable
the existence of a disembodied, omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good being
who intentionally caused the existence of the orderly universe ex nihilo. For our
purposes, consider the doctrine that such a disembodied, omniscient, omnipo-
tent, wholly good being exists to be theism. Take the doctrine that such a being
does not exist to be atheism.19 In a nutshell, Salmon’s and Martin’s atheistic
teleological arguments are given as follows:
If we pay close heed to experience, it is impossible to assign a high probability to the
hypothesis that the world, if created as a divine artifact, was the product of a God bearing
any resemblance to the theist’s conception. … Indeed, since disembodied intelligence
has never operated in any fashion, to the best of our knowledge, we must conclude from
experience that for such an intelligence [P(D)] = 0, and in that case [P(D,O)] is simply
undefined.20
To determine whether Salmon’s and Martin’s arguments beg crucial ques-
tions it is important to understand the likely dialectical situations for these argu-
ments. Salmon and Martin are trying to make probable the conclusion that the
world did not have an intelligent creator. As recent religious epistemology has
shown, there are quite distinct projects that one might have in mind for an argu-
ment. One might, for instance, attempt only to show that a particular person or
sect of people are rational in their beliefs. An argument, and a discussion of the
merits of that argument, might show that given other things that someone be-
lieves, that person is justified in holding some further belief. At most, these
considerations show that the person is rational in only a very weak sense. It
might be, for all the force of the argument proposed, that the person in question
is quite unjustified in holding some of their relevant beliefs. Given these unjus-
tified beliefs, it is rational for them to believe or do what they do, but also, given
that the person is unjustified in holding these beliefs, there is a stronger sense in
which they are not, ultimately, justified in their conclusion or action. If, on the
other hand, the person is justified in holding the premises of the argument, then
the verdict is, assuming the cogency of the argument in question, that the person
is rational in holding to the argument’s conclusion, at least after they are aware
that the premises adequately support the conclusion.
It is doubtful that either Salmon or Martin had either of these projects in
mind for their teleological arguments. Each makes claims for the straightfor-
ward, empirical nature of the crucial premises, with the implication that these
things are so generally known, or at least knowable by those who exert the least
effort, that the premises are part of the domain to which all readers are respon-
sible. I suspect, then, that they take the force of their arguments to be to show
that the conclusion of their arguments is the rational conclusion for all readers
of their arguments. They spell out the premises, of which we might not have
thought clearly, and they spell out the structure of the arguments, detailing their
17 Govier, A Practical Study of Argument, 85; for other pragmatic accounts, cf. David Sanford,
“Begging the Question,” Analysis, 32 (1972), 197–9; Frank Jackson, Conditionals (New York:
Blackwell, 1987), Ch. 7.
18 Douglas Walton, Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 52. Italics added.
19 Importantly, there is a wide gulf between atheism, so understood, and naturalism—the doc-
trine that there are “no spooks”. For a somewhat fuller discussion of this, cf. my “Theoretical
Virtues and Theological Construction”, International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, 41 (1997),
71–89.
20 Salmon,  “Religion and Science,” 153.
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merits, to make clear to their readers that the reasonably uncontroversial pre-
mises and the arguments with the manifest virtues warrant the denial of design
for the universe. Salmon and Martin don’t take themselves to be preaching to
the atheist choir, but to those who need to be converted to atheism. Their audi-
ence comprises theists and waverers—believers in intelligent design for the
universe and those who do not yet know what to think about whether the world
was created by an intelligent agent. To avoid begging the question Salmon and
Martin must appeal only to premises that are already believed by their target
audience or to those that can be made plausible to their audience without first
deciding the issue that separates them from their audience: whether the world
was designed. If they appeal to premises denied by the theist precisely because
the theist already thinks that the world has a creator or if they appeal to premises
that are not accepted by waverers precisely because they do not yet concede the
conclusion of either the theist or the atheist, then their arguments thereby beg
the question. A careful examination of their premises reveal that the question is
begged in precisely this way.
After setting out Bayes’ Theorem, Salmon notes Philo’s list of “springs and
principles” that give rise to various entities: biological generation, instinct, me-
chanical causation, and intelligent design. From what we know about cosmol-
ogy and astrophysics, it seems as though the processes that give rise to galaxies,
stars, and atoms are mechanical. Given that there are billions of galaxies each
containing billions of stars, each of which contains billions of atoms, “[t]here is,
consequently, a great deal of evidence pointing to the conclusion that the num-
ber of instances in which mechanical causation operates is almost incomprehen-
sibly greater than all of the rest combined.”21
Theists and waverers should not concede this point. Salmon lays out Philo’s
list of springs and principles and assumes that whenever biological generation,
instinct, or mechanical causation operate, intelligent design is not operative. A
convinced theist does not concede, this point precisely because when Salmon
confronts the theist with his atheistic teleological argument, the theist already
believes that the world had an intelligent designer and that all instances of bio-
logical, instinctual and mechanical generation are themselves the result of the
way the world was designed. A theist might or might not think that God is ac-
tively involved at each stage of the various generative processes. No matter.
The theist begins the dialogue with Salmon by believing that intelligent design
“lies behind” everything in the world, including the causal processes that give
rise to organisms, honeycombs and crystals. Salmon, as a premise of his argu-
ment, simply denies what the theist holds by virtue of being a theist. Hence, his
argument begs the question against a theist.
A parallel point holds for the waverer. The waverer doesn’t know what to
think about the existence and activities of a designer for the entire world. So,
they do not already concede that our knowledge of cosmology and astrophysics
shows that no agency was involved in the various generative processes we ob-
serve. That is the point that the waverer, perhaps, hopes the theist and atheist
will decide. If one doesn’t know whether the world has a designer, one doesn’t
know whether generative processes are, ultimately, the result of divine design or
not. Hence, the waverer doesn’t know that no intelligence operated to “begin”
the processes that, in the end, result in the formation of galaxies and stars, atoms
and molecules. So, Salmon’s premise begs the question against all but those
who are already convinced of Salmon’s atheistic conclusion.
The same fallacy recurs when Salmon discusses the particulars of the theist’s
designer hypothesis. God is supposed to be a single, omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly moral and wise being without a physical body. He claims that when-
ever we encounter enormous, complex entities they are more likely to be the
result of the corporate effort of finite, fallible, imperfect, embodied creatures.
“Indeed, since disembodied intelligence has never operated in any fashion, to
the best of our knowledge, we must conclude from experience that for such an
intelligence [P(D)] = 0, and in that case [P(D,O)] is simply undefined.”22 Salmon’s
basis for claiming that disembodied intelligence has never operated? Cosmol-
ogy and its supporting disciplines: thermodynamics and quantum mechanics.
On what basis could one be justified in asserting that disembodied intelli-
gence has never operated? The best way would be to observe fully all of the
causal mechanisms involved in all of the processes we observe. If a disembod-
ied agency were involved in none of the observed events, then one would be
justified in making Salmon’s claim. However, Salmon, quite correctly, notes
that his basis is rather different. The basis is that we can give explanations for
events, particularly the genesis of many objects like stars and atoms, without
appealing to the activities of a disembodied intelligence. “The universe appears
to be full of objects displaying high degrees of order whose existence can be
adequately explained without recourse to intelligent design on the part of a cre-
ator.”23 The theist and waverer can easily concede this point, with some care
regarding the nature of explanation. We do not observe the disembodied “hand”
of God involved in the production of water molecules or the formation of new
stars. A mere passing acquaintance with science reveals that the bodies of knowl-
edge that pass as the various sciences involve laws that make no reference to
God’s activities. It is, however, a mistake to move from “we have never ob-
served that a disembodied agent is involved in cases of process P” to “we have
observed that no disembodied agency is ever involved in cases of process P”.
Suppose that certain brands of theism are correct in claiming that God not
only created the universe, but also continues to sustain it in existence. Were God
to cease this sustaining activity, the universe would cease to exist. According to
this view, disembodied agency is involved in everything we observe. No excep-
tions. What would we observe were this kind of theism true? Exactly what we
do observe. We would observe clouds of cosmic dust swirling, condensing into
stars that burn until they reach the end of their lives. This process may be as
regular as one might like, describable in terms of familiar regularities to which
21 Ibid., 151.
22 Ibid., 153.
23 Salmon, “Experimental Atheism,” Philosophical Studies, 35 (1979), 103.
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we give the honorific title of “law”. That theism is consistent with all of our
observations shows that observations and our scientific theories are unable, on
their own, to provide any evidential wedge between theism and atheism. Any
wedge must come from extra-scientific considerations, contrary to Salmon’s
implication that it is scientific knowledge itself that does the most important
work in justifying atheism.
One proposing an atheistic teleological argument need not adopt a Humean
view of laws, but it is worth noting that Humeans are particularly poorly placed
to defend Salmon’s version of that argument. According to a Humean, laws are
nothing but the condensed statement of regularities in nature. Laws contain no
tacit reference to causal powers or mechanisms, save those that themselves in-
volve entities whose activities are describable in terms of Humean laws. There
can be no room for the law to tacitly state how entities behave on their own or
according to their own devices. That is content to which the Humean, qua
Humean about laws, is not entitled, since it is the Humean who tells us that the
proper way to understand laws is as mere descriptions, whether universal or
stochastic, of how things behave. It is illicit to sneak more content into “how
things behave” so that it means how they behave only on their own. The laws
make no mention of the (in)activity of a designer, but that is not the same as the
laws asserting that no designer is involved in the processes described by the
laws.
The Humean about laws is, at all levels of explanation, like medical scien-
tists who insist that the most we can expect from medicine is laws connecting
what we, given our somewhat different understanding of medicine, would think
of as relations between symptoms with no hope for uncovering the “deeper”,
real causes of diseases. According to our imagined medical scientist, medical
laws simply relate the regularities between fevers and aches and runny noses,
with no references to viral or bacterial infections. Such a medical science is
perfectly consistent with viral and bacterial infections being the underlying causes
of the symptoms and no amount of weight should be placed on the success of
“symptomatic” medical science to show that we should deny the existence of
viral and bacterial infections. Likewise, no Humean about laws can put any
argumentative weight on the success of the established sciences to show that no
disembodied agency is involved in typical biological, instinctual, and mechani-
cal generative mechanisms. The laws involved relate only the regular relations
between observable properties. What is uncontroversial and not question-beg-
ging is the claim that the relevant sciences, taken as bodies of empirical knowl-
edge, make no mention of God as a causal agent in the genesis of stars and
galaxies, atoms and molecules. What they do not contain, however, is the claim
that God is not involved in their genesis, at least as an ultimate cause, and it is
upon this claim that Salmon relies in his teleological argument and he relies
upon it as an empirical premise. He is wrong that it is empirical and Martin is
wrong that it fails to beg the question.24
The very same points apply to Martin’s series of arguments for the conclu-
sion that the theistic God does not exist. The initial premises of his arguments
are:
In terms of our experience, all created entities of the kinds that we have so far examined
are created by one or more beings with bodies.
In terms of our experience, all large and complex created entities of the kinds that we
have so far examined are created by a group of beings working together.
In terms of our experience, most seeming errors or mistakes in the kinds of created enti-
ties we have so far examined are the result of the fallibility of one or more creators of
entities.
In terms of our experience, all created entities of the kinds that we have so far examined
were created by a being or beings with finite power.
In terms of our experience, all created entities of the kinds that we have so far examined
are created from preexisting material.25
In each case, Martin claims that each is established by empirical observation. In
each case, the most that can be extracted from our observations is that we do not
observe the disembodied, single, infallible, infinite being creating objects ex
nihilo, i.e., we fail to observe that God creates things.26 What we do not observe
is that there is no such being operating in the world. If the theist is correct,
everything we observe is created, ultimately, by a single, disembodied, infal-
lible, infinite being and derives from what was created ex nihilo. In any case, the
premises are not acceptable to the theist because theists begin the process of
confronting Martin’s argument already disbelieving the key premises. This makes
them poor choices for one trying to persuade one on their basis. Since theists
begin the process disbelieving these premises precisely because they are theists,
the premises beg the question, just as Salmon’s did.
In the context of the atheist, theist and waverer trying to resolve the most
fundamental issues of natural theology by examining what we know about the
production of order, it seems that the atheist is not placed quite so well as the
theist. The theist can point out that of all the cases in which we know for sure
whether the ordered thing was produced by an intelligent agent it was, indeed,
24 My claim here is only that the premise is not an empirical premise and that as it stands it
begs the question against the theist and waverer. It is certainly open to Salmon to defend the
premise on different grounds, perhaps on the Humean grounds related to Hume’s discussion of
miracles. It might be argued that it is the greater miracle to think that God is at work in or behind
the order of the world and it is the lesser miracle that the order is the result of the “springs and
principles” that are internal to the constituents of physical reality. This, however, shows that the
premise in question begs the question. To show that the ordered entities produced by biological,
instinctual, and mechanical means are not the product of intelligent design, it is argued that theism
is the greater miracle than atheism. Salmon proposed the teleological argument to make atheism
more probable than theism for his audience. The defence of the key premise of the teleological
argument make the circle of the combined arguments obvious.
25 Martin, “Atheistic Teleological Arguments,”  47–54.
26 A theist who believes in God’s continuing creation of observable entities may hold that we
see God creating all the time. That it is God creating, and not some other intelligent being or no
intelligent being at all, is justified not by observation of the coming into being of these objects, but
by wider  theoretical considerations regarding the structure of reality. These wider considerations
are parallel to those Salmon and Martin must rely upon to justify their major premises.
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produced by an intelligent agent. At the very least, this is a non-question-beg-
ging premise from which to launch a teleological argument for the conclusion
that all order derives from an orderer. Admittedly, supplementary arguments are
required to get from this to theism proper, but rough arguments are not that
difficult to come by. The commonly-held contention that the argument from
design is powerless to yield classical theism is usually made too quickly and
without substantial argument. For instance, if the basic teleological argument
justifies the conclusion that all order ultimately involves an intelligent agent, it
follows that, according to contemporary science which treats all physical reality
as subject to laws (whether or not we have uncovered those laws accurately),
then all physical reality must be the result of an intelligent designer that is not
physical. This takes us to a disembodied creator. Infinite power is less straight-
forward, but may be approximated as follows. In all the cases in which we un-
derstand why something is limited in power, it is because of limitations on physical
attributes—limits on the number of muscle cells, their ability to fire simulta-
neously, limited supply of fuel to produce work, and the like. Since the intelli-
gent designer is not embodied, these causes for limitation are not available.
From our experience, we know of no other causes of finitude, so the designer
has no limitations on power. Something similar might be argued for lack of
limits on intelligence, thus undercutting the thought that the complex world in
which we live was designed by a team. A similar argument might be mounted
regarding moral imperfections, seeing them as arising out of cognitive limita-
tions, undercutting the thought that the apparent mistakes in the world are genu-
ine mistakes. No part of my project here demands that any of these consider-
ations, even the basic argument from design to the existence of an intelligent
designer, are very powerful. Nevertheless, the theistic teleological argument
can be formulated without begging the question and even though theism as un-
derstood here is a much richer doctrine than atheism, considerations deriving
from order in the world can provide the basis for arguments that take one from
the designer hypothesis to theism proper, a basis that deserves more exploration
than it has yet received.
Even if I am wrong that more of classical theism can be recovered via con-
siderations of order and design than is typically appreciated, in the multitude of
cases to which Salmon and Martin appeal—the organisms, honeycombs, and
crystals—the most that they are entitled to claim is that on the basis of observa-
tion alone we don’t know whether an intelligent agent is involved, either proxi-
mately or ultimately.27 Failing to observe the presence and activity of God, which
may be granted by the theist, is not the same as observing the absence of the
presence and activity of God. It is only the former that is established by empiri-
cal observation. The latter, if it may be established at all, is established only by
wider theoretical considerations about what there is in the world. A critic of
theism might maintain that theism is unwarranted, given our persistent failure to
observe God’s hand to be present in the order we see around us, but that is far
too weak for the needs of one putting forth an atheistic teleological argument.
That argument is supposed to show that theism is improbable. Given the nature
of the case and the nature of the disputants involved, simply asserting that we
never observe order that is brought about by God begs the question. Ultimately,
the only service Salmon’s and Martin’s arguments can serve is to show that
those who already deny theism are warranted in concluding that the world itself
does not depend for its existence on the activities of an intelligent agent. That is
not nothing, but it is not for what the proponents of the atheistic teleological
argument had hoped.
27 I gloss over thorny issues regarding the theory-neutrality of observation and what might
constitute the notion of “on the basis of observation alone.” I am entitled to be somewhat cavalier
here. Salmon and Martin claim that their reasons for main premises in their atheistic teleological
arguments is empirical, is based on science, must depend on there being a useful distinction be-
tween what we learn on the basis of observation in a relatively theory-neutral fashion and what we
do not. If no such distinction can be made workable for their purposes, so much the better for those
resisting their arguments.
